

THE CHARLOTTE JOURNAL.

"ETERNAL VIGILANCE IS THE PRICE OF LIBERTY," FOR "POWER IS ALWAYS STEALING FROM THE MANY TO THE FEW."

VOLUME XVIII.]

CHARLOTTE, N. C. JANUARY 20, 1848.

[NUMBER 16.]

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TERMS:
TWO DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS if not paid in advance. THREE DOLLARS if not paid within six months; and THREE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS if not paid until after the expiration of the year. No paper discontinued until all arrearages are paid, except at the option of the Editor.

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AGENTS.
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WEEKLY ALMANAC.

MOON'S PHASES.	January, 1848.
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SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN

In the Senate of the United States, January 12, 1848, upon his Resolutions.

Resolved, That to conquer Mexico and to hold it, either as a province or to incorporate it in the Union, would be inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted; a departure from the settled policy of the Government; in conflict with its character and genius; and in the end, subversive of our free and popular institutions.

Resolved, That no line of policy in the further prosecution of the war should be adopted which may lead to consequences so disastrous.

Mr. Calhoun said:—In offering, Senators, these resolutions for your consideration, I have been governed by the reasons which induced me to oppose the war, and by the same considerations I have been ever since guided. In alluding to my opposition to the war, I do not intend to notice the reasons which governed me on that occasion, further than is necessary to explain my motives upon the present. I opposed the war then, not only because I considered it unnecessary and that it might have been easily avoided; not only because I thought the President had no authority to order a portion of the territory in dispute and in possession of the Mexicans, to be occupied by our troops; not only because I believed the allegations upon which it was sanctioned by Congress were unfounded in truth, but from high considerations of reason and policy, because I believed it would lead to great and serious evils to the country and greatly endanger its free institutions.

But after the war was declared, and had received the sanction of the government, I acquiesced in what I could not prevent, and which it was impossible for me to arrest; and I then felt it to be my duty to limit my course so as to give that direction to the conduct of the war as would, as far as possible, prevent the evil and danger with which, in my opinion, it threatened the country and its institutions. For this purpose, at the last session, I suggested to the Senate a defensive line, and for that purpose, I now offer these resolutions. This, and this only, is the motive which governs me. I am moved by no personal or party considerations. My object is neither to sustain the Executive nor to strengthen the opposition; but simply to discharge an important duty to the country. But I shall express my opinion upon all points with boldness and independence, such as becomes a Senator who has nothing to ask, either from the government or from the people; and whose only aim is to diminish to the smallest possible amount, the evils incident to this war. But when I come to notice those points in which I differ from the President, I shall do it with all the decorum which is due to the Chief Magistrate of the Union.

When I suggested a defensive line at the last session, this country had in its possession, through the means of its arms, ample territory, and stood in a condition to force indemnity. Before then, the successes of our arms had gained all the contiguous portions of Mexico, and our army has ever since held all that it is desirable to hold—that portion whose population is sparse and on that account the more desirable to be held. For I hold it in reference to this war a fundamental principle, that when we receive territorial indemnity it shall be unoccupied territory.

In offering a defensive line, I did it because I believed that in the first place it was the only certain mode of terminating the war successfully. I did it also because I believed that it would be a vast saving of the sacrifice of human life; but above all, I did it because I saw that any other line of policy would expose us to tremendous evils, which these resolutions were intended to guard against. The President took a different view. He recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war—not for conquest—that was disavowed—but for the purpose of conquering peace; that is, to compel Mexico to sign a treaty making a sufficient cession of territory to indemnify this Government both for the claims of its citizens and for the expenses of the war. Sir, I opposed this policy. I opposed it among other reasons, because I believed that if the war should be ever so successful, there was great hazard to us at least, that the object intended to be effected by it would not be accomplished. Congress thought differently; ample provisions in men and money were granted for carrying on the war. The campaign has terminated.

It has been as successful as the Executive of the country could possibly have calculated. Victory after victory has followed in succession, without a single reverse. Santa Anna was repelled and defeated with all his forces—Vera Cruz and the Castle were carried with it. Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla fell, and after two great triumphs of our army, the gates of Mexico opened to us. Well, sir, what has been accomplished? What has been done? Has the avowed object of the war been attained? Have we conquered a peace? Have we obtained a treaty? Have we obtained any indemnity? No, sir; not a single object contemplated has been effected, and what is worse, our difficulties are greater now than they were then, and the objects, far more difficult to reach than they were before the campaign commenced.

Now Senators have asked what has caused this complete disfigure of the views of the Executive for which men and money were granted? It is not to be charged to our troops; they have done all that skill and gallantry was capable of effecting. It must be charged somewhere, and where is it to be charged, but upon the fact that the plan of the campaign was erroneous, that the object pursued was a mistake. We aimed at indemnity in a wrong way. If we had aimed directly to it, we had the means to accomplish it directly; they were in our hands. But sir, we aimed at indemnity through a treaty. We could not reach it by a treaty with Mexico, and Mexico by refusing to treat simply, could defeat the whole object which we had in view. We put out of our own power and in her hands to say, when the war should terminate.

We have for all our vast expenditure of money, for all the loss of blood and men, we have nothing, but the Military glory which the campaign has furnished.

We cannot I presume estimate the expenses of the campaign at less than \$40,000,000 of dollars. (I cannot compute the sum with any degree of precision, but I believe I may say about that sum,) and between the sword and disease, many thousands of lives, probably five, six, or seven thousand have been sacrificed; and all this for nothing at all.

But it is said that the occupancy of a defensive line would have been as expensive as the campaign itself. The President has assigned many reasons for that opinion, and the Secretary of War has done the same. I have examined these reasons with care. This is not the proper occasion to discuss them; but I must say, with all possible deference, they are to my mind utterly fallacious. I will put the question in a general point of view, and satisfy the minds of Senators that such is the case. The line proposed by myself, extending from the Pacific Ocean to the Paso del Norte, would have been covered by the Gulf of California, and the wilderness peopled by hostile tribes of Indians; and for its defence, nothing would have been needed beyond a few vessels of war stationed in the Gulf, and a single regiment. From the Paso del Norte to its mouth, we can readily estimate the amount of force necessary for its defence. It was a frontier between Texas and Mexico when Texas had not more than 150,000 of a population—without any standing army whatever, and very few troops. Yet for seven years Texas maintained that frontier line; and that, too, when Mexico was far more consolidated than she is now, when her revolutions were not so frequent, her resources in money were much greater, and Texas her only opponent. Can any man believe that Mexico, exhausted as she now is—prostrated as she has been—defeated—can any man believe that it will cost as much to defend that frontier as the last campaign has cost? No, sir, I will hazard nothing in asserting that the very interest of the money spent in the last campaign would have secured that line for an indefinite period; and that the men who have lost their lives would have been more than sufficient to defend it.

So much for the past; we now come to the commencement of another campaign; and the question recurs, what shall be done? The same measures are proposed. It is still "a vigorous prosecution of the war." The measures are identically the same. It is not for conquest—that is now, as emphatically disavowed as it was in the first instance. The object is not to blot Mexico out of the list of nations, for the President is a emphatic in the expression of his desire to maintain the nationality of Mexico. He desires to see her an independent and flourishing community, and assigns strong and cogent reasons for all that. Well, sir, the question is now, what ought to be done? We are now coming to the practical question. Shall we aim at carrying on another vigorous campaign under present circumstances?

Mr. President, I have examined this question with care, and I repeat, that I cannot support the recommendations of the President. There are many and powerful reasons, stronger than those which existed at the commencement of the last campaign, to justify my opposition now. The cost in money will be vastly greater. There is a bill for ten additional regiments now before the Senate, and another bill providing for twenty regiments of volunteers, has been reported, making in all, not less, I suppose, than 25,000 troops, raising the number of troops in the service, as I presume, the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs can inform you, to not much less than 70,000 in the whole. Well, sir, the expense will be much more than that of the last campaign. It will cost not much short of \$60,000,000.

Now, sir, what is the condition of the money market at present? Last year it was most flourishing. An unfortunate failure in Europe created a great demand for our agricultural products. The balance of trade was in our favor. If money poured out one end of the sub-treasury, it poured in at the other. But how stands the case now? We stand now with the drain both ways. The exchanges are against us, and therefore, instead of gold and silver, flowing into the country it will flow out. The expenses of the war must be met either by remittances in gold and silver or by drafts drawn in favor of British merchants, or other capitalists there, which must be cashed here and also transmitted abroad. Now, sir, what will be the operation of this state of things? How long can this continue? What is the present price of treasury notes and of stocks in the market? Are they above par? No, sir. I see them quoted below par. I understand the treasury notes are sensibly below par and stocks still lower. Now what is to be the result? So long as treasury notes are below par—so long as they are the cheaper medium—the end of it will be, that treasury notes will go into the treasury and specie come out of it. There is very great danger that at last your treasury will be drained to the bottom.

Now, sir, in this state of things, what can possibly follow? A great commercial crisis—a great financial crisis—even possibly, a suspension of the banks. I do not pretend to deal in the language of panic. But there is danger of all this, of which there was not the slightest apprehension at the commencement of last session. At present, there is great danger. The great difficulty in prosecuting your campaign will be to obtain money. Men you may raise, but money it will be difficult to get. I have conversed with a gentleman who ought to know these things better than myself; and he supposed that \$40,000,000 would be required either in the shape of treasury notes or stocks to carry on the campaign. I asked at what price money could be had; and the reply was, that it would be at the rate of 90 for 100, which would be rather more than 7 per cent. I believe.

But, sir, these are not the only objections, formidable as they are. The farther you proceed, the difficulties will increase. I do not see the slightest chance that can tend to the realization of what it is avowed, the prosecution of the war is intended to accomplish. The object is to obtain a treaty. We no longer hear of conquering a peace, but of obtaining an honorable treaty; the meaning of which, is neither more nor less, than that we are to obtain a treaty from Mexico, giving us a cession of land equal to the whole indemnity already stated in the former part of my remarks. Well, sir, as it strikes me, whether war is successful or unsuccessful, it must certainly end in the defeat of the object, for the attainment of which, it is avowedly prosecuted. If the war be unsuccessful, I need not argue the point. If we should be killed in our arms—as I trust we will not be, and I think is not very likely to be the case—but if circumstances should prove unfortunate for us, and we should not be able to accomplish, in a military point of view, what is characterized as a vigorous prosecution of the war, then, certainly there will be no treaty. I insist upon it that the more successfully this war is prosecuted, the more certain will be the defeat of the object designed to be accomplished, whilst the objects disavowed will be accomplished. How is a successful war to be carried out? What is the object of it? What is it intended to effect? I can see but one thing to be effected. It is to suppress all resistance in Mexico, to overpower and disperse her army, to overthrow her civil government, and to leave her without any further power of resistance. Well, Mr. President, if that be done, what is the result? How are you to get an honorable peace? It takes but one party to make war—two parties to make peace. If all authority in Mexico be overthrown, if there be no legitimate power with whom to negotiate, how are you to accomplish those objects which it is proclaimed this vigorous prosecution of the war is intended to effect? Sir, you are defeated by your success. That will be the clear and inevitable result. But what do you accomplish? The very object which you disavow! For if the war should be so prosecuted, where will be the nationality of Mexico? Where her separate existence? Where this free republic with whom you desire to treat? Gone! We have blotted her out of the list of nations. She has become a mere mass of individuals without any political existence, and the sovereignty of the country, at least for the time being, is transferred to us. Now, Mr. President, this is not only a conclusion from reasoning upon this subject, but it is one to which, if I understand the President aright, he comes with a single exception, and that, a mere contingency not likely to take place. The President has very much the same conception of the object of a vigorous war as I have presented. He says that the great difficulty of getting peace, results from this that the people of Mexico are divided under factious chiefs, and that the chieftain in power dare not give peace because his rival would then be able to turn him out; and that the only way to remedy this evil and obtain a treaty, is to put down the whole of them. Well, what is to be done then? Is the thing to stop here? No. We are then to build up again and establish under our power and protection a republican form of government from the citizens who are well disposed, which he says are numerous and are prevented from obtaining it, only by fear of those military chiefs. And it is with this government, sir, which is to grow up under the encouragement and protection of our army—to be established

by their authority that it is proposed to treat, in order to obtain peace. I must confess I am at a loss to see how a free and independent republic can grow up under the protection and authority of its conqueror. I do not see how such a government can be established under his authority. I can readily understand how an aristocracy—a hawking government—a despotism, might be established by a conqueror. But how a free and independent republic can grow up under such circumstances, it is to me incomprehensible. I had always supposed that a republican government was the spontaneous work of the people—that it came from the people—from the hearts of the people;—that it must emanate from the hearts of the people, and that it required no support—no protection from any quarter whatever. But, sir, it seems that these are antiquated notions—obsolete ideas,—and that we may now manufacture republics by order, by authority of a conquering government.

But suppose, sir, all these difficulties surmounted. How can you make a free government in Mexico? Where are your materials? It is to be, I presume, a confederated government like our own. Where is the intelligence in Mexico adequate to the construction of such a government? That is what she has been aiming at for twenty odd years, but so utterly incompetent are her people for the work, that it has been a complete failure from beginning to end. The great body of the intelligence and wealth of Mexico is concentrated in the priesthood, who are altogether disinclined to that form of government. Then the owners of the haciendas—the large planters of the country, who comprise almost all the remaining mass of intelligence, are without opportunities of concert and destitute of the means of forming such a government. Sir, such a government would be impossible—and if put up, would tumble down the very next day after our protection was withdrawn.

It appears to me to be a far more plausible plan, if it is determined to have peace, to sustain the government that now exists in Mexico; or rather to refrain from putting it down. Let it grow up and mature itself. I have conversed with several of the officers of the army—men of intelligence—on this subject, and all agree in the opinion that the mere shadow of a government which now remains at Queretaro, will have no authority whatever, and that if we were to make peace in any degree conformatory to our view of what a peace ought to be, the very moment we withdrew it would be overthrown; and what then? The very country assigned to us by the peace for an indemnity, we must either hold defensively and be brought back ultimately to the defensive line, which would be the end of the whole of it; or, return and renew this war till it terminates in the conquest of the country.

I protest utterly against this government undertaking to build up any government in Mexico with the pledge of protection. The party placed in power must be inevitably overthrown, and we will be under the solemn obligation to return and re-instate them in power; and that would occur again and again; till the country would fall into our hands precisely as Hindostan fell into the hands of the English. This very conquest of Hindostan which we have been censuring for years and years, ever since I recollect, was the result of mistaken policy, leading on from step to step, each one deeper and deeper—scarcely any design of conquest being entertained, but ultimately conquest became unavoidable and it was necessary not only to hold the country, but to conquer the adjacent territory.

Well, sir, if this contingency follows—if the Executive fails in establishing another government there under our encouragement and protection, and if the government itself shall refuse to make a treaty with us on such terms as we will accept in regard to indemnity, then the President himself agrees that he must take the very course which I have said would be the inevitable consequence of a vigorous prosecution of the war. The President says in substance, after having attempted to build up such a government—after having employed the best efforts to secure peace upon the most liberal terms; if all fail; I now give his own words—if all fail, we must hold on to the occupation of the country, we must take the measure of indemnity into our own hands, and enforce such terms as the honor of the country demands. Now, sir, what is this? Is it not an acknowledgment, that if this factitious government, which is aimed at, cannot be built up, we must make a conquest of the whole country and occupy it—can words be stronger? "Occupy the country."—Take the full measure of indemnity—no defensive line—no treaty;—and enforce terms;—terms on whom? on the government?—No, no. It is to enforce the terms on the people individually; that is to say, to establish a government over them in the form of provinces.

Well, the President is right. If in the vigorous prosecution of the war, as the President proposes, the contingency should fail, and the chances of its failure are many, there will be no retreating. Every argument against calling back the army, as they designate it—against taking a defensive line, which is now advanced will have double force after you have spent \$60,000,000 of and have acquired possession of the whole of Mexico. The interests in favor of keeping us there will be much more influential than now. The army itself will be larger. Those who live by the war—a large and powerful body—the numerous contractors, the sutlers, the merchants, the speculators in the lands and mines of Mexico, and all engaged every way, directly or

indirectly in the progress of the war, and absorbing the whole expenditures, will be all averse to retiring, and will swell the cry in favor of continuing and extending conquest. The President talks, sir, of taking indemnity into our hands, then; but, why not take indemnity now? We are much nearer indemnity now, than we will be at the end of the next campaign, when we shall have sixty millions added to the expenditure of the last forty. What will you then have to indemnify you? Nothing but a Mexican population, on whom you are to impose taxation in all forms and shapes; and amongst which you will have to maintain an army of at least forty thousand men; according to the Senator from Mississippi, [Mr. Davis]—for he says, that the army now there exceeding that number, are in danger. That there is no indemnity at all. You will never get enough in that way to meet your expenditures. It will all have to come out of the pockets of the people of the United States; and after all, the talk of indemnity, of pushing on this war vigorously to success, at the end of the next campaign, instead of indemnity, you will have a heavy pecuniary burden imposed upon the present and succeeding generation.

Well, Mr. President, we have now come to the solemn question proposed by these resolutions. I have shown where this line of policy will, in all probability, lead you, —I may say, will inevitably lead you, unless some unexpected contingency should prevent. It will lead to the blotting out of the nationality of Mexico, and the throwing of eight or nine millions of people without a government on your hands. It will compel you, in all probability, to assume the government, for, I think, there will be very little prospect of your retiring. You must either hold the country as a province or incorporate it into your Union. Shall we do either? That's the question. Far from us be such an act, and for the reasons contained in the resolutions.

The first of these reasons is this: it would be inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted. That needs no argument after what has been said. Since the commencement of the war till this moment, every man has disavowed the intention of conquest; of extinguishing the existence of Mexico as a people. It has been constantly proclaimed that the only object was indemnity. And yet, sir, as events are moving on, what we disavow may be accomplished, and what we have avowed may be defeated. Sir, this result will be a dark and lasting imputation on either the sincerity or the intelligence of the government; on its sincerity because so opposite to your own avowals; on your intelligence, for the want of a clear foresight in so plain a case as not to discern the consequences.

Sir, we have heard how much glory our country has acquired in the war. I acknowledge it to the full amount. Mr. President, so far as military glory is concerned. The army has done nobly—chivalrously—they have conferred honor on the country, for which I sincerely thank them. Mr. President, I believe all our thanks will be confined to our army. So far as I know in the civilized world, there is no approbation of the conduct of the civil portion of our power. On the contrary, every where the declaration is made, that we are an ambitious, unjust, hard people, more given to war than any people of modern times. Whether this be true or not, it is not for me to inquire. I am speaking now merely of the reputation which we bear abroad. Every where, I believe, for as much as we have gained in military reputation abroad, I regret to perceive, we have lost in our political and civil reputation. Now sir, much as I regard military glory—much as I rejoice to behold our people in possession of the indomitable energy and courage which surmount all difficulties, and which class them amongst the first military people of the age, I would be very sorry indeed that our government should lose any reputation for wisdom, moderation, discretion, justice, and those other high qualities which have distinguished us in the early stages of our history.

The next reason which my resolutions assign, is, that it is without example or precedent, either to hold Mexico as a province or to incorporate her into our Union. No example of such a line of policy can be found. We have conquered many of the neighboring tribes of Indians, but we never thought of holding them in subjection—never of incorporating them into our Union. They have either been left as an independent people amongst us, or been driven into the forests.

I know farther, sir, that we have never dreamt of incorporating into our Union any but the Caucasian race—the free white race. To incorporate Mexico, would be the very first instance of the kind of incorporating an Indian race, for more than half of the Mexicans are Indians, and the other is composed chiefly of mixed tribes. I protest against such a union as that! Our's, sir, is the government of the white man. The greatest misfortune of Spanish America are to be traced to the fatal error of placing these colored races on an equality with the white race. That error destroyed the social arrangement which formed the basis of society. The Portuguese and ourselves have escaped—the Portuguese at least to some extent—and we are the only people on this continent which have made revolutions without being followed by anarchy. And it is professed and talked about to erect these Mexicans into a territorial government, and place them on an equality with the people of the United States. I protest utterly against such a project.

Sir, it is a remarkable fact, that in the

whole history of man, as far as my knowledge extends, there is no instance whatever of any civilized colored races being found equal to the establishment of free popular government, although by far the largest portion of the human family is composed of these races. And even in the savage state we scarcely find them any where with such government, except it be our noble savages—for noble I will call them. They for the most part had free institutions, but they are easily sustained amongst a savage people. Are we to overlook this fact? Are we to associate with ourselves as equals, companions, and fellow-citizens, the Indians and mixed race of Mexico? Sir, I should consider such a thing as fatal to our institutions.

The next two reasons which I assigned, were, that it would be in conflict with the genius and character of our institutions, and subversive of our free government. I take these two together as they are intimately connected; and now of the first—to hold Mexico in subjection.

Mr. President, there are some propositions too clear for argument; and before such a body as the Senate, I should consider a loss of time to undertake to prove that to hold Mexico as a subject province would be hostile, and in conflict with our free popular institutions, and in the end subversive of them. Sir, he who knows the American Constitution well—he who has fully studied its character;—he who has looked at history and knows what has been the effect of conquests of free States invariably, will require no proof at my hands to show that it would be entirely hostile to the institutions of the country, to hold Mexico as a province. There is not an example on record of any free State even having attempted the conquest of any territory approaching the extent of Mexico without disastrous consequences. The nation conquered have in time conquered the conquerors by destroying their liberty. That will be our case, sir. The conquest of Mexico would add so vast an amount to the patronage of this government, that it would absorb the whole power of the States in the Union. This Union would become imperial, and the States mere subordinate corporations. But the evil will not end there. The process will go on. The same process by which the power would be transferred from the States to the Union, will transfer the whole from this department of the government (I speak of the legislature) to the Executive. All the added power and added patronage which conquest will create, will pass to the Executive. In the end you put in the hands of the Executive the power of conquering you. You give to it, sir, such splendor, such ample means, that with the principles of proscription which unfortunately prevail in our country, that the struggle will be greater at every presidential election than our institutions can possibly endure. The end of it will be that that branch of the government will become all powerful and the result is inevitable—anarchy and despotism. It is as certain as I am this day addressing the Senate.

Sir, let it not be said that Great Britain furnishes an example to the contrary—that she holds provinces of vast extent of population without materially impairing the liberty of the citizen, or exposing her to anarchy, confusion or corruption. It is so. But what is the explanation? Of all governments that ever existed affording any protection whatever to liberty, the English Government far transcends them all in that respect. She can bear more patronage in proportion to her population and wealth than any government of that form that ever existed, nay, to go farther, than can despotism in its most absolute form. I will not go into the philosophy of this. That would take me farther from the tract than I desire. But I will say in a very few words, it results from the fact that her Executive and the House of Peers, the conservative branch of her government, are both hereditary. The Roman government may have exceeded and did exceed the British government in its power for conquest; but no people ever did exist, and probably never will exist, with such a capacity for conquest as that people. But the capacity of Rome to hold subjected provinces, was as nothing compared to that of Great Britain, and hence, as soon as the Roman power passed from Italy beyond the Adriatic on one side, and the Alps on the other, and the Mediterranean, their liberty fell prostrate—the Roman people became a rabble—corruption penetrated everywhere, and violence and anarchy ruled the day. Now, we see England with dependent provinces of vastly greater territorial extent, and probably not less in population—I have not examined—we see her going on without impairing personal liberty or exposing the government to violence or anarchy. Yet the English have not wholly escaped. Although they have retained their liberty and have not fallen into anarchy and despotism, yet we behold the population of England crushed to the earth by the superincumbent weight of debt. Reflecting on that government, I have often thought that there was only one way in which it could come to an end—that the weight of the superstructure would crush the foundation—that the wealth accumulated in part by these very conquests by the higher classes crush the laboring masses below. But has she obtained indemnity from all her subjected provinces? On the contrary, instead of drawing the means of supporting herself from them, has she not been compelled to resort to the labor of her own population to hold them in subjection? And has she not thrown a burden upon them, which, with all their industry and skill—with all their vast accumulation of capital and pow-